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THE ASBESTOS CASE AT THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: THE TREATMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
REGULATIONS UNDER THE GENERAL AGREEMENT OF
TARIFFS AND TRADE 1994 AND THE AGREEMENT ON
TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE
Irene McConnellf
I. INTRODUCTION

On January 1, 1997, French Decree No. 96-1133' banning the use of
asbestos in France came into force. The Decree prohibits the use of all
varieties of asbestos fibres and products containing asbestos fibres.
Temporary exceptions to the prohibition are made for certain listed
products containing chrysotile fibres (a particular type of asbestos fibre)
and for used vehicles and agricultural and forestry machinery in circulation
prior to the ban. The Decree is designed to protect the health of a broad
section of the French population from the serious diseases linked to the
inhalation of asbestos fibres - asbestosis, lung cancer, and cancer of the
linings of the lung (mesothelioma). At risk are workers in the mining and
processing sectors and in the textile, building and automobile industries as
well as do-it-yourselfers and the general public who might be exposed to
the numerous products containing asbestos fibres. These products include
asbestos cement (used, for example, in pipes, roof tiles and cladding,
partitions and false ceilings), insulation, and friction linings for brakes,
clutches and engines. Substitutes for asbestos fibres exist in the form of
fibres made of polyvinyl alcohol, cellulose and glass.
The French ban on asbestos presents a serious economic loss for
Canada which mines and exports chrysotile asbestos. With an annual
production of chrysotile valued at $225 million (Canadian), the chrysotile
mining industry supports about 1,300 direct jobs and as many indirect jobs,
while the processing industry provides about 1,500 jobs. In 1997, Canada
tAssociate Professor of Law, University of Calgary.
'Decret No. 96-1133 du 24 Decembre 1996 relatif a l'interdiction de l'amiante, pris en
application du code du travail et du code de la consummation, J.O., Dec. 26, 1996, p. 19126.
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exported a total of 430,000 tonnes of chrysotile worldwide. Before the
ban, Canada exported approximately 32,000 tonnes of chrysotile to France,
most of which France used to manufacture chrysotile-cement products.
Since the ban, exports to France have virtually disappeared.2 The economic
repercussions for Canada's chrysotile mining industry could extend beyond
the lost sales to France to include losses in other markets. The European
Commission is preparing legislation to prohibit asbestos in all fifteen
European Union countries and Canada fears that developing countries
might adopt similar prohibitions.
Canada challenged the legality of the French Decree at the World
Trade Organization (WTO) on two grounds: as a technical regulation
which violated certain rules in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT Agreement)3 and as a measure which violated the national
treatment obligation and the prohibition against quantitative restrictions in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GAIT 1994).' Canada
also claimed, under Article XXIII 1(b) of the GAT[ 1994, that the
application of the Decree nullified or impaired benefits it expected under
the GATT. The European Communities, on behalf of the French
government, argued that the Decree was not covered by the TBT
Agreement or, in any case, that the Decree complied with the TBT
Agreement. With regard to the GATT 1994, the European Communities
argued that the Decree did not violate GATT rules or, if it did, that it
could be justified as a measure necessary to protect human health and life.
This note examines the WTO Panel and Appellate Body Reports in
the Asbestos case.- It focuses on those developments in the Asbestos case
that have implications for the autonomy of WTO members to regulate for
the protection of public health in the face of the rules they have agreed to
under the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement. With respect to the TBT
Agreement, this note examines two issues: the definition of a technical
regulation which determines when a public health measure is subject to the

'WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-MeasuresAffecting Asbestos and
Asbestos - Containing Products, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000), paras. 3.20, 3.23
[hereinafter Asbestos Panel Report].
'Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, LT/UR/A-1A/10 [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
4 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade

Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS
1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].

OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.

'See Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2; see also WTO Appellate Body Report, European
Communities-Measures Affecting
Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products,

WT/DS135/ABIR (Mar. 12, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 497 (2001) [hereinafter Asbestos Appellate
Body Report].
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disciplines of the TBT Agreement and the test for establishing when a
technical regulation is an unnecessary obstacle to trade. As to the GATT
1994, the focus is on three issues: the determination of the "likeness" of
products for the purpose of the national treatment rule, the test for
establishing the necessity of a public health measure, and the cause of
action available to an exporting country if a public health measure of the
importing country has nullified or impaired benefits it expected to receive
after reciprocal trade negotiations. The analysis pays particular attention
to the devices that have been instituted in the GAT 1994 and the TBT
Agreement to ensure, on the one hand, that access to global markets is
maximized and, on the other hand, that legitimate public health
regulations are allowed.
II. THE DECREE IS CHALLENGED UNDER THE AGREEMENT ON
TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE

Is the Decree a Technical Regulation?
To address Canada's claims under the TBT Agreement, the Panel had
to determine that the Decree was a "technical regulation." The TBT
Agreement defines a technical regulation as a:

A.

Document which lays down product characteristics ... including the

applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is
mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology,
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to
a product... 6

The Panel concluded that, under this definition, a technical regulation
must set out the specific characteristics of products which allow them to be
marketed in the regulating country.' Furthermore, the Panel suggested
that a technical regulation must also identify products by name or perhaps
by category or function.8
The Panel examined the structure of the Decree and ruled that it was
not a technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT Agreement. The
Panel concluded that the Decree consisted of two parts: a prohibition on
the use of asbestos and asbestos products and exceptions to the
prohibition. It ruled that the prohibition on asbestos was not a technical
regulation, because it did not specify characteristics which would make a
product marketable in France nor did it identify particular products.9
6

TBT Agreement, supranote 3, Annex 1.1.

7

Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.75.

8Id. paras.

8.38, 8.40.
'Id. paras. 8.39 - 8.41.
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While the exceptions to the prohibition did fall within the definition of a
technical regulation, because they identified characteristics of specified
products which made them marketable in France, Canada's claims related
solely to the prohibition (the part of the Decree ruled not to be a technical
regulation) and were dismissed.
Canada appealed the Panel's findings before the Appellate Body
where it argued, first, that the Decree should be treated as a single unified
measure for the purpose of characterizing it as a technical regulation under
the TBT Agreement and, secondly, that the Decree constituted a technical
regulation as defined in the TBT Agreement.
The Appellate Body rejected the two-step approach that the Panel
adopted for characterizing the Decree. It ruled that the Decree must be
treated as an integrated whole, while recognizing that both prohibitive and
permissive elements are essential to the structure of the measure: the
Decree does not impose a total ban because exceptions are permitted, and
the exceptions define the scope of the prohibition." The Appellate Body
noted that the definition of technical regulation in the TBT Agreement
prescribed several requirements. First, a technical regulation must lay
down, in the sense of set forth, stipulate or provide, product characteristics.
Characteristics refers to the "'features,' 'qualities,' 'attributes' or other
'distinguishing mark"' of identifiable products without necessarily
specifying or naming particular products (as the Panel had suggested was
necessary). Secondly, product characteristics include features and qualities
intrinsic to the product itself as well as related characteristics, such as those
used to identify a product or to regulate the presentation and appearance
of a product. Finally, characteristics may be prescribed affirmatively - by
laying out the characteristics a product must possess - or negatively - by
laying out the characteristics a product must not possess."
The Appellate Body concluded that the French Decree, viewed as an
integrated whole, constitutes a technical regulation. The Appellate Body
expressed doubt, however, that a prohibition on asbestos fibres in their
natural state is a technical regulation; a bare prohibition, without more,
does not prescribe or impose any characteristics on asbestos fibres. 2
However, the Decree extends the prohibition to products containing
asbestos fibres. This prohibition prescribes characteristics of products,
albeit in a negative formulation, by requiring that all products must not
contain asbestos fibres. And although the prohibition does not name

"0Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, paras. 64, 73.

"Id. paras. 67-69.
"Id. para. 71.
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specific products, the products are identifiable - those products
containing asbestos are banned."
The Appellate Body's ruling made the Decree subject to the TBT
Agreement but it declined to address Canada's claims that the Decree
violated several provisions of the TBT Agreement. The Appellate Body
concluded that it had no basis for examining Canada's claims, citing as
reasons for its conclusion the insufficiency of facts on the record, the
absence of factual and legal findings by the Panel as well as the lack of
jurisprudence on the TBT Agreement.1
III. THE DECREE IS CHALLENGED UNDER THE GATT"1994
Does the Decree Violate the National Treatment Rule of the GATT
1994?
Canada claimed that the Decree violated the GATT 1994 - the
prohibition on asbestos was discriminatory contrary to the national
and the prohibition against quantitative
treatment rule in Article 111.415
16
XI.1.
Article
in
restrictions
The Panel found that the prohibition on asbestos fibres and asbestos
products violated the national treatment rule of Article 111.4. The Decree
banned all asbestos fibres and asbestos products while substitute fibres polyvinyl alcohol, cellulose and glass (PCG fibres) - and products

A.

"3Id. para. 72.
14
1d. para. 78. Recently, a WTO Panel has handed down a Report interpreting Article 2.4 of
the TBT Agreement. WTO Panel Report, European Communities-Trade Description of
Sardines, WT/DS231/R (May 29, 2002). The European Communities have filed a Notice of
Appeal. See WTO Panel Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines,
WT/DS231/11 & WT/DS231/12 (July 4, 2002).
15
GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. 111.4.
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other country shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
Id.
1Id. art. X.1.
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other
measures shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party
or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party.
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containing PCG fibres were not banned. The result was that less favorable
treatment was given to asbestos imports than to PCG fibres produced
domestically." Having found a violation of Article 111.4, the Panel found it
unnecessary to rule on the violation of Article XI.
In concluding that the prohibition on asbestos violated Article 111.4,
the Panel was required to find that chrysotile fibres and PCG fibres are
"like products" and consequently, must be accorded national treatment.
In determining "likeness," the Panel applied four criteria that previous
GATT and WTO jurisprudence had established: the properties, nature and
quality of the products; the products' end-uses in a given market;
consumers' tastes and habits; and international tariff classification of
products. 8 The Panel noted that, in purely physical terms, the products
were not alike - none of them had the same physical structure or
chemical composition.' 9 However, the Panel stated that likeness is to be
determined not by classifying products on a scientific basis, but rather by
recognizing the commercial context of Article III, which is designed to
discourage protectionist measures that provide an advantage for domestic
products and reduce market access for foreign products. 0
Against this commercial context, the Panel compared the
characteristics of chrysotile fibres, on the one hand, and PCG fibres, on the
other hand as well as their end uses. The Panel ruled that, to the extent
that one product can replace another in a given market when they both
have certain (but not necessarily all) end-uses in common, their properties
are equivalent and therefore "like." Even though the end-uses for
chrysotile fibres and PCG fibres were the same for only a small number of
applications, the Panel concluded that asbestos and PCG fibres were
alike. 2' The Panel did not find helpful or conclusive the two remaining
criteria for determining likeness - consumers' tastes and habits and
international tariff classification.
Applying analogous reasoning and
noting that individual cement-based products have the same tariff
classification, regardless of the fibres' uses, the Panel concluded that

"Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, paras. 8.154-8.155.
" Id. paras. 8.112-8.113. The first three criteria were originally identified in Working Party
Report, Border Tax Adjustments, Dec. 2, 1970, GAT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 97. The
fourth criterion, tariff classification, was not mentioned in the Border Tax Adjustments
Report but was included by subsequent panels and by the Appellate Body. Asbestos
Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 73.
"Asbestos Panel Report, supranote 2, para. 8.121.

"Id. para. 8.122.
21Id. paras. 8.125-8.126.
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products containing chrysotile fibres were like products containing PCG
fibres. 2
In its analysis of likeness, the Panel rejected risk to human health as a
criterion for differentiating between chrysotile fibres and PCG fibres. The
Panel reasoned that allowing risk to determine likeness would virtually
foreclose the application of other criteria for determining likeness.'
Furthermore, the structure of the GATT 1994 required considering risk
under Article XX(b) (as evidence relevant to establishing the need to
protect health) and not under Article III which is designed to discipline the
trade effects of domestic regulation free from any mitigating factors such
as risks to health.
On appeal, the European Communites requested the Appellate Body
to reverse the Panel's findings that the products at issue are like products.
The European Communities argued, in particular, that the Panel had erred
in excluding health risks in its determination of likeness.
The Appellate Body noted that, although the term "like products"
appears in a number of GATT provisions, the term is not defined" and
26
must derive its meaning on the basis of the rules for interpreting treaties.
These stipulate that a term is interpreted according to the ordinary
meaning of the term in its context and in the light of the object and
purpose of the treaty. The ordinary meaning, according to a dictionary
definition cited by the Appellate Body, suggests that products are "like"
when they "share a number of identical or similar characteristics., 27 This
definition, however, fails to indicate which characteristics are important in
determining likeness, to what degree these characteristics must be shared,
and from whose perspective (the producer or consumer) likeness should
be judged.28
To resolve these matters, the Appellate Body turned to the context of
Article 111.4, which it found in the general principle of non-protection set
out in Article 111.1. Article III is designed to avoid protectionism in the
use of internal taxes and regulations by obliging WTO members to provide
221d.

paras. 8.145-8.150.

Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.131.
23Asbestos
2
1Id. para. 8.130.
25Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 88. The term "like product" appears
not only in the GATT 1994 but also in other WTO agreements. The term may be defined in
some cases, for example, in Article 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement but other
agreements, such as the GATF 1994, do not define the term.
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679.
27
Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 91.
Id. para. 92.
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equality of competitive conditions as between imported and domestic
products.29 Determining likeness becomes, essentially, a question of
determining the nature and extent of the competitiveness or
substitutability of products in the marketplace. The Appellate Body
recognized that competitive relationships exist along a spectrum but
declined to indicate, in the abstract, the point along the spectrum at which
likeness is established. This point will vary from case to case and will
require an element of discretionary judgement. 30
The Appellate Body accepted the framework of the four criteria
(physical properties, end-uses, consumers' tastes and habits, and tariff
classification), which the Panel had used as a tool for determining likeness
between chrysotile fibres and PCG fibres. It noted, however, that the
framework is but a tool and that the criteria are not closed; in the final
analysis, all relevant evidence must be considered on a case-by-case basis
in determining likeness . While accepting the usefulness of the framework,
the Appellate Body ruled that the Panel had erred in its application of the
four criteria. 2 It had rested its finding of likeness, essentially, on one
criterion - the small number of shared end-uses; it had largely ignored
differences in physical characteristics and in tariff classification and had
considered no evidence of consumers' tastes and habits. The correct
approach required considering the evidence relating to each criterion and
then weighing all the evidence in making a final determination of likeness.
In addition, the Panel had erred in excluding evidence of health risks
33
posed by chrysotile and PCG fibres when it considered likeness.
Although risk need not be included as a separate criterion, evidence of risk
is relevant in evaluating likeness under the existing criteria, particularly,
physical characteristics and consumers' tastes and habits.34 For example,
the carcinogenicity of chrysotile fibres can influence the choices consumers
make between chrysotile and PCG fibres.
On the issue of the likeness of chrysotile-cement products and PCGcement products, the Appellate Body found similar errors in the Panel's
analysis. 5 Accordingly, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's findings
of likeness and embarked on an independent analysis and application of
the four criteria. In its analysis, the Appellate Body paid particular
9

Id. para. 98.

Id. para. 99.

31Id. paras. 102, 133.

3:

Id. para. 109.
Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, paras. 114-115.

4d.

para. 113.

" Id. para. 127.
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attention to how the criteria can determine the competitive relationship
between chrysotile and PCG fibres in the marketplace and, hence, their
likeness.
On the first criterion, the physical characteristics of a product, the
Appellate Body noted the Panel's finding that chrysotile and PCG fibres
are physically very different. In the case of chrysotile, its combination of
molecular structure, chemical composition, and fibrillation capacity makes
it carcinogenic. This carcinogenicity is a defining aspect of the physical
properties of chrysotile fibres." Moreover, the types of cancer chrysotile
causes have a mortality rate of close to one hundred percent. In contrast,
PCG fibres do not pose the same level of risk to human health. Given
these significant physical differences, the Appellate Body noted that a high
burden rested on Canada to present evidence, based on the remaining
criteria, of such a degree of substitutability as to suggest that chrysotile and
PCG fibres are "like products." Canada failed to produce such evidence.
There was no evidence, apart from a small number of shared end-uses, that
other possible end-uses might be shared; nor was there evidence of
consumers' tastes and habits. Canada failed to overcome the inference,
drawn from the different physical characteristics and the different tariff
classification, that the products are not "like."
On the application of the first criterion to the likeness of cementbased products (those made with chrysotile fibres on the one hand and
those made with PCG fibres on the other hand), the Appellate Body noted
that the composition of these products appears to be similar, except that
there is one important difference - one set of products contains a known
carcinogen (chrysotile) and the other set does not.37 Canada presented no
evidence to indicate how this difference affected consumers' tastes and
habits. Without this evidence, which might have spoken to potentially
shared characteristics and their competitiveness or substitutability in the
marketplace, no determination of likeness could be made. 38
In the result, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding of
likeness and found that Canada had not satisfied its burden to prove
likeness. Absent a finding of likeness, Canada could not succeed in its
claim that the Decree violated the national treatment rule of Article 111.4.
On the issue of determining likeness, one member of the Appellate
Body made a separate statement - concurring in the result (the products
are not like) but disagreeing with the analysis. 39 This member presented

36See id. paras. 134-136.

Id. para. 142.
3'Id. para. 147.
See Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5,paras. 149-154.
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two submissions. The first focused on the centrality of the carcinogenicity
of chrysotile in determining likeness. It was submitted that, once the
Appellate Body had accepted evidence that the inhalation of chrysotile
fibres poses a serious carcinogenic risk, it had ample basis for concluding
definitively that chrysotile fibres are not like PCG fibres. Any evidence as
to the competitive relationship between chrysotile and PCG fibres that
might be reflected in similar end-uses and consumers' tastes and habits
simply could not outweigh the evidence of carcinogenicity. The second
submission cast doubt on the Appellate Body's decision to adopt a
fundamentally economic interpretation of likeness for the purpose of
Article III, one focused on examining the competitive relationship
between products. Moreover, the Asbestos case was an unsatisfactory
vehicle for ascribing a fundamental role to competitiveness in determining
likeness because the parties to the dispute failed to provide the Appellate
Body with sufficient evidence on which to make a ruling on a matter of
"such importance and philosophical import."40
B.

Is the Decree Justified as a Measure Necessary to ProtectHealth?
Because the Panel found that the French Decree violated the national
treatment rule of Article III, the European Communities turned to Article
XX(b) to justify the violation. There was no need for the European
Communities to invoke Article XX(b) before the Appellate Body because
the latter found the Decree to be consistent with the national treatment
rule. However, Canada appealed the Panel's ruling on the issue of the
necessity of the French Decree as a measure to protect health and the
Appellate Body responded to Canada's points of appeal. Thus, the
Asbestos case provides jurisprudence on Article XX(b) both from the
Panel and, for the first time, from the Appellate Body.
Before the Panel, the European Communities argued that, if the
Decree violated Article III, it was justified under Article XX(b) as a
measure necessary to protect human life and health. The European
Communities defended the ban on chrysotile on the basis that it is the only
measure capable of halting the risks of cancer associated with the use of
chrysotile products. Canada, in turn, argued that the ban could not be
justified under Article XX(b) on two grounds: first chrysotile-cement
products do not pose any detectable risk to health because the fibres are
encapsulated and release no carcinogenic agents; and, secondly, regulating
the safe or controlled use of chrysotile-cement products provides a less
trade-restricting alternative to a ban on the use of asbestos.

' Id. para. 154.
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The Panel examined the Decree following the two-step analysis of
Article XX prescribed by the Appellate Body, examining France's ban,
first, for provisional justification under paragraph (b) as a measure
necessary to protect human health and, secondly, for compliance with the
and disguised
prohibitions against unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimination
41
restrictions on trade set out in the chapeau to Article XX.
1. Protection of Human Life or Health
The Panel began its analysis of paragraph (b) by noting that the words
"to protect human health" required the European Communities to
establish a prima face case, on the balance of probabilities that chrysotile
products pose a risk to human health. 2 The European Communities did so
by presenting evidence that international bodies, such as the International
Agency for Research on Cancer and the World Health Organization, have
acknowledged since 1977, the carcinogenicity of chrysotile fibres when
inhaled. Evidence showed that the types of cancers caused by chrysotile
have a mortality rate of close to one hundred percent. Furthermore, risks
of cancer exist even with incidental exposure to chrysotile, and medical
science has been unable to establish a threshold below which exposure to
chrysotile poses no carcinogenic risk. The Panel relied heavily on four
scientific experts who testified that chrysotile-cement products pose a
serious carcinogenic risk. On the basis of this evidence, the Panel
concluded that chrysotile fibres, including those encased in a cement
matrix, pose a health risk to those working with chrysotile products. 3
Accordingly, the French policy to ban chrysotile fell within the range of
policies designed to protect human life within the meaning of paragraph
(b).
Before the Appellate Body, Canada questioned the Panel's
assessment of the credibility of and the weight to be given to the various
elements of the scientific evidence on the risk posed by chrysotile products
presented by the European Communities. The Appellate Body ruled that
GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. XX(b).
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures: ... (b) necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health ....
Id.
42Asbestos Panel Report, supranote 2, para. 8.184.
I paras. 8.193-8.194.
Id.
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the Panel's reliance on the evidence from the international bodies and the
four scientific experts showed that the Panel had remained well within the
bounds of its discretion as a trier of facts. Furthermore, government
authorities are permitted to take action on the basis of a qualified and
respected divergent opinion and need not automatically follow a majority
scientific opinion. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's conclusion that
the 44French ban on asbestos is a measure that protects human health or
life.
2. Necessity of the Asbestos Ban
To complete its examination of the ban on asbestos under paragraph
(b), the Panel turned to the word "necessary" in the text and on the basis
of two previous Panel reports, 45 reasoned that the necessity of the ban
would be determined, first, by identifying the scope of the health policy
objectives pursued by France and, secondly, by considering whether an
alternative measure exists that is consistent or less inconsistent with the
GATT.46 As to the scope of the health policy objectives, the Panel noted
that the numerous applications of chrysotile products expose a broad
section of the French population to an undeniable health risk even at low
or intermittent exposure levels. France had chosen to meet its objective to
halt the spread of this serious risk with a serious measure - a prohibition
on the use of asbestos. Although the high level of protection chosen by
France could not be challenged per se, France was required to justify the
level of protection offered by the ban by showing that no alternative
measure existed that was reasonably available and would achieve the high
level of protection it desired 7 Canada argued that an alternative did exist
in the form of regulating the safe or "controlled use" of chrysotile products
based on international standards. Controlled use would require taking
precautionary measures to restrict the release of fibres (through the use of
special tools, high density products, and special methods for handling
chrysotile products) and to decontaminate equipment and work clothing.
The Panel concluded that controlled use was not an alternative to the
ban on asbestos." First, controlled use would not allow France to achieve
its goal to halt the spread of asbestos-related health risks. Although
Id. para. 163.
Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, WT/DS10/R,
Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200, 30 I.L.M. 1122 (1991); United StatesSection 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345
'5

(1988-1989).
46Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.199.

4"Id. para. 8.208.
'8 Id. paras. 8.209-8.212.
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controlled use might protect workers who mined, processed and removed
chrysotile, it would not protect others who had been particularly targeted
for protection by the ban. These include workers in the building sector,
who are highly mobile, sometimes inadequately trained and dispersed over
a large number of sites; do-it-yourselfers, who operate outside any proper
system of controls; and others among the population, who are present at
work sites and exposed to chrysotile fibres as a result of pure chance.
Secondly, controlled use is not reasonably available as an alternative to a
ban on the use of asbestos. Although France could be expected to make
the necessary expenditures to implement controlled use, given its
advanced labor legislation and specialized administrative capacity, it would
be unreasonable to expect France to do so when the circumstances of
controlled use are, as in this case, simply not controllable.
On appeal, Canada challenged the Panel's ruling on necessity.
Canada argued that the Panel was required to quantify the health risks of
chrysotile-cement products and not simply accept the "hypotheses" of risk
presented by the French authorities.4 9 The Appellate Body responded that
risk can be assessed either quantitatively or qualitatively and that the
Panel's (presumably qualitative) assessment adequately evaluated the
nature and character of the risk: there is no threshold below which
chrysotile does not pose a carcinogenic risk and the cancers caused by
chrysotile are of an extremely serious nature. 5 Canada also questioned the
legitimacy of choosing a level of protection that requires banning
chrysotile while allowing the use of PCG fibres without a more extensive
assessment of the health risks of the latter.5 ' The Appellate Body observed
that the Decree is clearly designed to meet the level of protection France
has chosen -

to halt the spread of asbestos-related health risks -

by

prohibiting all forms of asbestos and severely restricting the use of
chrysotile asbestos. France was not to be constrained in achieving the level
of protection it desired because PCG fibres might pose a health risk which,
in any case, was a lesser risk than that posed by chrysotile fibres.5 2 Finally,
Canada argued that a suggested alternative was reasonably available
unless the alternative proved impossible to implement; controlled use was
not impossible to implement.5 3 In responding to Canada's argument, the
Appellate Body laid down several factors that must be considered in
determining whether a suggested alternative is reasonably available: first,
49Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 165.

"Id. para. 167.
"Id. para. 165.
Id. para. 168.
Id. para. 169.
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the administrative difficulties in implementing the alternative; secondly,
the extent to which the alternative measure contributes to the realization
of the objective; thirdly, how vital or important are the common interests
or values pursued - the higher these are the more likely it is that the
measure chosen will be necessary; and fourthly, the degree to which
alternative measures that would achieve the same objective are more or
less trade-restrictive. 4
Citing the Panel's findings on the shortcomings of controlled use, the
Appellate Body concluded that controlled use would not eliminate
asbestos-related health risks and would not allow France to achieve its
chosen level of health protection.
3. Unjustifiable or Arbitrary Discrimination or Disguised Restriction
on International Trade
Once provisional justification for the ban on asbestos had been
established under paragraph (b), the Panel examined the ban for
conformity with the conditions set out in the introductory clause of Article
XX. The Panel found that there was no evidence that discrimination of the
sort prohibited by Article XX - for example, unjustifiable or arbitrary
discrimination between suppliers of asbestos fibres or products - existed
on the face of the import ban or in its application. There was no evidence
that French authorities adopted the Decree as a guise for concealing the
pursuit of trade-restrictive objectives or with the objective of protecting
the domestic production of PCG fibres. Indeed, the Panel accepted that
the Decree was the response of French authorities to the "panicked public
opinion" at the failure of French authorities in the past to protect the
population from health risks.5 The Panel's findings on the introductory
clause were not appealed.
C. Does the Decree Nullify or Impair Benefits under Article XXIII.1 (b)?
Before the Panel, Canada claimed that the French Decree nullified or
impaired benefits it legitimately expected under the GATI 1994 - the
benefits being improved market access for chrysotile asbestos resulting
from tariff concessions made during negotiations in 1947 and 1962. Article
XXIII.I(b) of the GATT 1994 offers a cause of action when any measure
nullifies or impairs expected benefits, whether or not that measure
conflicts with the provisions of the GATT 199426 (Article XXIII.1(b) is

Id. para. 172.

" Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.238
'6The relevant parts of Article XXIII.1(b) read:
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commonly referred to as providing for a cause of action on the grounds of
"non-violation nullification and impairment.") The purpose of Article
XXIII.1(b), according to earlier GATT Panels, is to encourage countries to
make reciprocal tariff concessions by providing a remedy when a measure
impairs benefits expected from the exchange of concessions." This remedy,
however, has always been regarded as exceptional and one to be exercised
with caution! 8
The European Communities argued, in response, that Canada could
not claim legitimate expectations of benefits with respect to a measure
taken to protect life or health. While legitimate expectations might exist
for purely commercial measures, they could not exist for health measures
which a country imposes as part of its fundamental duty to protect public
health. 9 Both the Panel and the Appellate Body rejected this argument
and allowed Canada to invoke Article XXIII.1(b) on the basis that the text
of Article XXIII.I(b) allows a claim against "any measure" and cannot be
read to exclude any categories of measures, such as those related to health.
Having allowed Canada to invoke Article XXIII.I(b), the Panel went
on to consider the substance of Canada's claim. The Panel recognized that
WTO Members have agreed, through Article XX, that the pursuit of
certain interests, such as public health, are more important and can
outweigh commercial interests.60 However, the Panel noted that recourse
to Article XXIII.1(b) does not prevent a country from adopting or
implementing a public health measure under Article XX because there is
no requirement for the country to withdraw the measure.' At the same

If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired
or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being
impeded as the result of ... (b) the application by another contracting
party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of
this Agreement ... the contracting party may, with a view to the
satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or
proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be
concerned.
TBT Agreement, supra note 3.
17 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para.
185.
58 Id. para. 186.
Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.257.
6oId. para. 8.272.
61 Id para. 8.262. The Panel's reasoning is based on the introductory
language of Article XX
which states "nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement ... of measures ... " together with the consequences of a non-violation
application of a measure as stated in Article 26.1 of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. GATT 1994, supra note 4. Article 26.1
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time, the Panel recognized that recourse to Article XXIII.1(b) can
compromise the effectiveness of pursuing public health objectives if the
regulating country has to pay compensation for the level of benefits
nullified or impaired by its public health measure. 62 To minimize eroding a
member's right to use Article XX in the face of an Article XXIII.1(b)
claim, the Panel imposed two limitations on its use. First, any increase in
the cost of a public health measure resulting from a successful claim under
Article XXIII.I(b) could only be "very marginal."6 Secondly, the
exceptional nature of an Article XXIII.1(b) claim imposes a stricter
burden of proof on the claimant, particularly with respect to two matters:
the existence of legitimate expectations of benefits and whether the
measure challenged could be reasonably anticipated. 64
Canada's claim under Article XXIII.1(b) turned on whether it could
have reasonably expected, at the conclusion of the last round of tariff
negotiations (1993 when the Uruguay Round ended), that France would
not adopt a total ban on the use of asbestos. 6 According to the Panel, it
was unreasonable for Canada to expect that France would not ban
asbestos given the developments in the last 25 years. For example,
accumulated scientific data had established the hazardous nature of
chrysotile, the World Health Organization had classified chrysotile as a
carcinogen, a Convention of the International Labour Organization
required national lawmakers to provide for the replacement of asbestos
with less hazardous substitutes, and several European countries had
banned the use of asbestos. As a result, Canada failed to establish its claim
for non-violation nullification and impairment.'6
IV. COMMENTARY

Government regulation of products for public health purposes can
create barriers to trade. Simply by their existence, product requirements
will keep out of the marketplace those foreign goods which do not meet
the importing country's requirements. Also, by their difference from one
country to another, product requirements restrict trade by imposing
increased costs of compliance on foreign producers: as foreign producers
add production runs to meet different requirements in different markets,
of the DSU provides for the granting of compensation rather than the withdrawal of a
measure. Id.

Id. paras. 8.270, 8.273. Compensation is available under DSU, Article 26.
Id. para. 8.273.
Id. para. 8.282.
Id. para. 8.294.
Id. paras. 8.295-8.298.
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opportunities for saving costs from economies of scale are diminished. As
the Asbestos case illustrates, WTO members have recognized the adverse
effects that regulatory diversity can have on trade and have agreed to
certain rules, under the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement, which
impose constraints on their use of public health regulations. The Asbestos
case provides jurisprudence on how some of these rules are to be
interpreted and applied and some insight into the extent to which WTO
members have constrained their authority to regulate for the purpose of
protecting public health.
A.

Treatment of Public Health Regulation under the TBT Agreement

1. Definition of Technical Barrier to Trade
The Asbestos case provided the first opportunity for the WTO to
produce jurisprudence on the TBT Agreement. The jurisprudence is
narrowly focused on interpreting the definition of "technical regulation"
but even this narrow focus is useful because it delineates the scope of
coverage of the TBT Agreement. As defined by the Appellate Body, a
technical regulation is a document that includes some element which "lays
down," in the sense of setting forth or stipulating a characteristic of a
product, that is, some feature, quality or attribute of a product. Many
product regulations will fall within this definition of a technical regulation,
for it is difficult to regulate the use of a product without including some
element which sets forth an attribute or feature or qualification of that
product. As a result, many product regulations will be subject to the
disciplines imposed in the TBT Agreement.
According to the Appellate Body, a ban on a product in its natural
state is probably not a technical regulation because such a ban does not
prescribe or impose any characteristics on a product. Presumably, a
product in its natural state simply exists and this existential quality is not
imposed on it by regulation. However, the text of the definition refers to a
document which lays down "product characteristics," that is, characteristics
of a product. Arguably, a regulation can ban a product on the basis of its
characteristics whether that ban applies to a product in its natural state or
incorporated into another product. Thus, the French Decree can be
viewed as a document which stipulates that a product (in this case, a fibre)
which has particular characteristics (those of asbestos) cannot be
marketed. Also included in the ban are products which contain asbestos,
presumably because of the particular characteristics of asbestos. Thus, if
asbestos fibres are banned on the basis of the characteristics of asbestos, it

6 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 71.
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should be of no import, for the purpose of the definition of technical
regulation, whether the product is banned in its natural state or banned
when it is contained in another product. If a ban on products in their
natural state can fall within the definition of a technical regulation, the
scope of coverage of the TBT Agreement is significantly increased. For
example, as governments review the safety of products that have been
allowed in the past, current science may dictate a ban on a product because
of its characteristics whether in a natural state or incorporated into another
product. Such a ban may well be subject to the rules of the TBT
Agreement.
2. Unnecessary Obstacle to Trade
According to the Appellate Body, the TBT Agreement is a
"specialized legal regime"' for measures that fall within the definition of
technical regulations. Although the Appellate Body declined to apply this
regime to the French Decree for the reasons noted above, it did state that
the obligations under this regime appear to differ from and add to the
obligations imposed under the GATT 1994. Thus, while there is some
uncertainty as to how the obligations are to be interpreted and applied, a
reading of the text leaves little doubt that obligations in addition to the
GATT 1994 obligations are imposed in the TBT Agreement. Canada
challenged the French Decree as contrary to the TBT Agreement with
respect to four of these obligations: it was discriminatory contrary to the
national treatment rule in Article 2.1; it was an unnecessary obstacle to
trade contrary to Article 2.2; it was not based on an international standard
as required in Article 2.4; and it was framed on the basis of descriptive
characteristics rather than performance requirements contrary to Article
2.8.
To the extent that the French Decree is a technical regulation and can
be challenged under the TBT Agreement and is also an internal measure
subject to Article III of the GAIT 1994, it must meet the national
treatment rule set out in each of the agreements. Once the national
treatment rule has been met under the GATT 1994, there is no
requirement to justify the measure, for example, as a measure necessary to
protect human health. Under the GATT 1994, justification is only needed
if the measure violates the national treatment rule. The case is quite
different under the TBT Agreement. A technical regulation must meet
the requirements of the national treatment rule as set out in the TBT
Agreement, and it must also meet a number of additional rules, including

6

'Id.
para. 80.
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the three which Canada claimed were not met in the case of the French
Decree.
Arguably, the most onerous and far-reaching of the additional rules is
found in the requirement in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement that
technical regulations not create "unnecessary obstacles to trade." This
rule is designed to catch non-discriminatory regulations which,
nonetheless, restrict trade, simply because they exist or because they are
different from those in other countries. The interpretation and application
of this rule can have a significant impact on regulatory autonomy, for it
makes a non-discriminatory regulation (which would be consistent with the
GATT 1994) subject to the additional requirements of Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement. Article 2.2 has not been the subject of GATT or WTO
jurisprudence and as a result, its implications for the regulatory autonomy
of national authorities have not been considered. This note, however, will
suggest an interpretation of Article 2.2 and its implication for regulatory
autonomy.
Article 2.2 requires members not to use technical regulations, either
advertently or inadvertently, which create unnecessary obstacles to trade.
The second sentence of Article 2.2 gives meaning to this requirement by
stating that technical regulations "shall not be more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks nonfulfillment would create." The third sentence identifies legitimate
objectives to include "protection of human health or safety, animal or
plant life or health, or the environment." 9 The fourth sentence states that,
in assessing the risks created by not fulfilling the objective of protecting
health, relevant elements are, among other things, "available scientific and
technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses
of products."
Deciding whether a technical regulation is an unnecessary obstacle to
trade requires, at a minimum, that the regulating country take account of
certain risks - namely "the risks non-fulfillment would create." Both
Canada and the European Communities argued before the Panel that this
is a requirement to assess the risks associated with the failure to adopt the
technical regulation in question. 70 This argument, however, is problematic.
Although the text does not specify what "non-fulfillment" refers to, the
context suggests that non-fulfillment refers to the failure to fulfil an
objective and not the failure to adopt a technical regulation. Elsewhere in
Article 2, the words "fulfill" and "fulfillment" are used in association with

" Other legitimate objectives include "national security requirements" and "prevention of
deceptive practices." TBT Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2.2.
7 See Asbestos PanelReport, supra note 2, paras. 3.279, 3.290.
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the word "objective."'" The better interpretation is that Article 2.2 calls for
an assessment of the risks posed by the use of a particular product if an
objective sought by the regulating country is not achieved. In the case of
the French Decree, there is a requirement for France to assess the risks to
health posed by the use of asbestos products if its objective to halt the
spread of asbestos-related diseases is not achieved. In addition, Article 2.2
identifies certain relevant elements to be considered in assessing the risks namely, scientific and technical information, related processing technology
or intended end-uses of the products. Thus, at a minimum, Article 2.2
makes explicit the requirement for an assessment of the risks that are
created if the regulatory objective is not met together with the elements to
be considered in that assessment.
Additionally, Article 2.2 requires that this assessment of risks be
taken into account in determining whether a technical regulation is
"not... more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate
objective. ,12 This text suggests that the regulating country take account of
the risks for two purposes. One purpose is to establish that the technical
regulation is a measure designed to "fulfill a legitimate objective," in other
words, that there is a rational connection between the technical regulation
and the objective sought. A preliminary step would identify the objective
sought as one which is "legitimate" within the meaning of Article 2.2.
Then, the assessment would identify the risks that would be created if the
objective were not fulfilled and a technical regulation would be designed to
take those risks into account, that is, to avoid the risks identified. A
technical regulation so designed would have a rational connection to the
objective it was to fulfill. In the case of the French Decree, the assessment
would identify the risks to health posed by asbestos products if the
objective of halting the spread of asbestos-related diseases were not
fulfilled. France would then design its technical regulation (in the case of
the Decree, a ban on asbestos products) to avoid the risks identified in the
assessment. One purpose of the assessment of risks is to provide a basis for
establishing a rational connection between the objective sought (halting
the spread of asbestos-related diseases) and the means (the technical
regulation banning asbestos products) of fulfilling that objective.
The second purpose of the assessment of risks is to provide a basis for
determining the degree of trade-restrictiveness allowed in a technical
regulation. The text states that a technical regulation is to be no more

71See TBT Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2.2, 2.4, 2.7.

n Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiary,9 EUR.

J. INT'L L. 32 (1998), at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol9/Nol/art3.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2002). Trachtman refers to this as a "curious phrase" added to the necessity test. Id.
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trade-restrictive than is "necessary" to fulfill the objective sought. The
word "necessary," in this context, refers to the degree of trade
restrictiveness that is permitted in a technical regulation: it is to be as trade
restrictive as necessary to fulfill the objective. In the context in which it is
used, the word "necessary" does not invite an inquiry into the necessity for
a particular objective or the particular level of protection sought. If the
objective is legitimate within the meaning of Article 2.2, the level of
protection is not called into issue. Nor does the word "necessary" invite an
inquiry into the necessity of a particular technical regulation to fulfill the
objective (as is the case under paragraph (b) of Article XX in the GATT
1994). The word "necessary" invites a determination of the degree of
trade-restrictiveness that is required if the technical regulation is to fulfil
the objective sought. The assessment of risks provides a mechanism for
making this determination. The task for the regulating country is to find a
technical regulation that is the least trade-restrictive and, at the same time,
will permit the regulating country to avoid the risks identified in the
assessment. The second purpose of the assessment of risks is to provide a
tool for choosing between alternative technical regulations to find the one
that avoids the risks identified in the assessment and that is the least traderestrictive means of doing so. In the case of the French Decree, France
need only choose the alternative suggested by Canada, the less traderestrictive technical regulation prescribing controlled use, if controlled use
avoids the risks posed by asbestos products as identified in the assessment.
In sum, Article 2.2 requires that the regulating country conduct an
assessment of risks to health in accordance with the scientific and other
objective elements set out in the last sentence of Article 2.2. The risk
assessment will then be used for two purposes. One purpose is to establish
that there is a rational connection between the technical regulation chosen
and the legitimate objective sought. The second purpose is to identify the
least trade-restrictive means that will (or, to use treaty language is
"necessary") to achieve that objective. Thus, the risk assessment provides
a mechanism for trading off two sets of values - the economic gains from
increased trade, on the one hand, and protection from unhealthy products,
on the other hand. It does so by providing a mechanism for establishing
rationality between means and objective sought and for finding the least
trade-restrictive means available for accomplishing the objective.
This approach to interpreting the requirements of the second sentence
of Article 2.2 assures an importing country that, if its assessment of risks
shows that an alternative measure creates risks of not fulfilling its public
health objectives, the alternative measure will not be forced on it. At the
same time, this approach provides protection for exporting countries that
their traders will only be burdened by regulations which are supported by
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an assessment of the risks (conducted in accordance with scientific and
other objective elements) and are only as trade-restrictive as necessary to
avoid the risks identified in the assessment. This approach gives effect to
two of the objectives stated in the preamble to the TBT agreement. One
objective assures the importing country that it will not be "prevented from
taking measures necessary... for the protection of human, animal or plant
life or health.., at the levels it considers appropriate .... 7 The second
objective protects the traders of the exporting country with the assurance
that technical regulations are not to "create unnecessary obstacles to
international trade. 74
For the reasons cited by the Appellate Body when it declined to
examine the merits of Canada's claim that the French Decree violated
Article 2.2, it would be premature to predict whether the Decree is indeed
an unnecessary obstacle to trade. However, the European Communities
offered risk assessments which established to the satisfaction of both the
Panel and the Appellate Body that controlled use is not a measure that is
reasonably available to meet the French goal of halting the risks of
asbestos-related diseases for the purpose of the necessity test in Article
XX(b) of the GATT 1994. This evidence may well have constituted a risk
assessment that would have established, for the purpose of Article 2.2 of
the TBT Agreement, that risks of not fulfilling the French objective could
only be avoided by adopting the Decree prohibiting the use of asbestos
fibres and products.
B.

Treatment of Public Health Regulation under the GA TT 1994
There are three significant developments in the jurisprudence on the
GATT 1994 in the Asbestos case that have implications for the latitude
that governments have to regulate to protect public health without
violating their obligations under the GATT 1994; first, the interpretation
given to the phrase "like products;" secondly, the test for necessity if a
regulation which otherwise violates a GATT 1994 obligation can,
nevertheless, be justified as a "measure necessary to protect human life or
health;" and finally, the opportunity for compensation that GATT 1994
offers to the exporting country if it has suffered nullification or impairment
of benefits resulting from the public health regulation.
1. Like Products
Determining the likeness of an import and a product of domestic
origin is of vital importance when a complaint is made that the national

13TBT

Agreement, supra note 3, pmbl., para. 6. (emphasis added).

Id. pmbl., para. 5.
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treatment rule has been violated. Only imports which are "like" domestic
products must be accorded national treatment with respect to internal
taxes and regulations. For example, if a domestic automobile which
produces no emissions of benzene, a chemical toxic to humans, is
characterized as essentially "like" an imported automobile which emits
large quantities of benzene, a ban on the sale of the polluting import would
violate the national treatment rule.
GAT and WTO jurisprudence has recognized the substantial
implications that result from categorizing products as "like" or "unlike"
for the latitude available to WTO members to make regulatory distinctions
between products. One GATT Panel explained the implications in this
way:
The Panel recognized that the treatment of imported and domestic
products as like products under Article III may have significant
implications for the scope of obligations under the General Agreement
and for the regulatory autonomy of contracting parties with respect to
their internal tax laws and regulations: once products are designated as
like products, a regulatory product differentiation, e.g. for
standardization or environmental purposes, becomes inconsistent with
Article III . . .7

This explanation reveals that the criteria and characteristics chosen to
categorize products as like or unlike will determine, to a large extent, when
national authorities can differentiate between imports and domestic
products without offending the national treatment rule. Thus, the criteria
used for determining likeness will play a significant role in determining
whether distinctions drawn between imports and domestic products
constitute legitimate regulatory activity under the national treatment rule.76
Prior to the Asbestos case, GATT and WTO jurisprudence had
developed a framework of four criteria for evaluating evidence of likeness
between products: these consisted of the properties, nature and quality of
the products; the products' end-uses in a given market; consumers' tastes
and habits; and international tariff classification of products. In the
Asbestos case, the Appellate Body accepted this framework as useful for
determining likeness. At the same time, the Appellate Body made it clear
that this framework of four criteria was not closed - other criteria could be
included and all criteria could accommodate new dimensions, such as the
7 United States Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992, 39 GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 279, para. 5.30 (1992).
" Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the
World Trade Organization,98 MIcH. L. REV. 2329, 2332 n.5 (2000). See Trachtman, supra
note 72, at 65-67.
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consideration of the risks posed by the products at issue. This addition to
the jurisprudence on likeness has the potential for increasing the scope for
drawing permissible distinctions between products and consequently,
increasing the range of legitimate regulations available for protecting
public health.
For example, examining the properties, nature and quality of a
product need not stop at examining the physical characteristics of that
product but can include examining the consequences that flow from the
physical characteristics. Such was the case when the Appellate Body
considered that a defining characteristic of the physical structure and
chemistry of chrysotile asbestos was its carcinogenicity. To give another
example, a defining characteristic of wood treated under pressure by
chromated copper arsenic may be the toxic effects that arsenic has on
humans, plants and animals and may provide a legitimate means of
differentiating pressure-treated wood from untreated wood for regulatory
purposes. The Appellate Body's ruling that risk to health is a relevant
characteristic for differentiating between products has increased the scope
for legitimate regulatory activity by accepting externalities that flow from
the characteristics of a product as a means of drawing legitimate
distinctions between products.7 ' The carcinogenic risk of chrysotile fibres
on humans can be viewed as an externality that is not present in PCG
fibres; similarly, the toxicity of chromated copper arsenic in pressuretreated wood is an externality that is not present in untreated wood.
The Appellate Body has decided determining likeness is
fundamentally a question of examining the competitiveness or
substitutability of products in the marketplace to ensure that regulations
provide equality of competitive conditions between imports and domestic
products. This ruling is troubling unless the marketplace is viewed as it
actually exists in the real world and allowances are made for its limitations
and failures. 78 Thus, competition in the marketplace should reflect not
only the perspective of producers whose interest is to maximize sales but
also the perspective of consumers whose interests are served when they
can make informed decisions about the products offered for sale: however,
not often is a buyer as knowledgeable about the safety of a product as the

7

Howse, supra note 76, at 2332 (differentiating products on the basis of environmental

externalities as a legitimate regulatory activity is suggested by Howse).

7 This "real world" approach was applied by the Appellate Body when it concluded that

risk assessments should be conducted not just under controlled laboratory conditions but
also in recognition of conditions that exist in the "real world." WTO Appellate Body, EC
Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 5, 1998),
available at www.wto.org. For example, drugs may be carelessly treated and their abuse
inadequately controlled.
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producer.' 9 Differentiating between products on the basis of the
asymmetric information available to producer and consumer should be
factored in when consumers' tastes and habits are examined for evidence
of likeness.
The market may not operate efficiently or at all to provide goods that
are not harmful to health. For example, the market may produce only one
pesticide for agricultural products that is safe for human use over the longterm. If the price of the safe pesticide is double that of other pesticides
(because production costs are double), consumers may shun the safe
pesticide, particularly in the face of inadequate information on safety of
the various pesticides. This deficiency in the market should be considered
when determining the likeness of two pesticides: one that is safe for human
use and the other that is safe only in restricted and controlled
circumstances. This is a case where national authorities should not be
constrained in making a regulatory distinction to permit the use of one and
severely restrict or prohibit the use of the others because the market has
produced only one pesticide that serves the public good. To allow such a
regulatory distinction under the national treatment rule requires an
acknowledgment of the limitations of the market and the corresponding
need for regulatory activity.
If competitiveness and substitutability in the marketplace are to
provide the context for applying criteria to evaluate the likeness of
products, then the conditions of the marketplace as they exist in the real
world must form the matrix in which likeness is examined. The Appellate
Body's failure to take a broader view of the marketplace leaves it
vulnerable to the criticism voiced by one of the members of the Appellate
Body in the Asbestos case that the Appellate Body has not adequately
considered the effects on regulatory autonomy of a fundamentally
economic interpretation of likeness.
2. Necessary to Protect Health
As noted earlier, once a public health regulation has met the
requirements of the national treatment rule of the GATT 1994, there is no
further requirement to justify it, for example, as necessary to protect
human health. That requirement only arises if the national treatment rule
has been violated. Both the Panel and the Appellate Body made rulings on
Article XX(b) which should provide guidance to members on what is
required to justify a regulation as "necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health." Although both GATT and WTO panels have

9 See Michael J. Trebilcock, An Introduction to the Economic Approach to Law, LAW AND
ECON. 360, 364 (1994).
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interpreted Article XX(b) in the past, the Asbestos case provided the first
opportunity for the Appellate Body to consider Article XX(b).
Justification under Article XX(b) begins when the regulating country
must present evidence to establish a primafacie case that there is a risk to
health that requires a remedial measure. This assessment of risk must
establish, as in the case of the TBT Agreement, that the risk exists, either
on a quantitative or qualitative basis. The threshold for establishing that a
risk exists appears to be rather low. Although the European Communities
established that a serious health risk existed in the Asbestos case, both the
Panel and Appellate Body suggested that a country justifying its regulation
need only establish that the policy underlying the challenged measure falls
within the range of policies covered in paragraph (b). 8° This threshold
requirement resembles the rather loose rational connection test between
means and ends found in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. It appears
that it is not necessary to establish that a serious risk exists nor is it
necessary to conduct a risk assessment in accordance with specified
requirements such as those set out in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
Moreover, in assessing risk, national authorities are entitled to consider
qualified divergent opinions and need not automatically adhere to the
majority opinion.
Once risk has been established, the level of protection chosen by the
regulating country to address that risk cannot be challenged per se. The
regulating country, however, must justify the level of protection it has
chosen by showing that no alternative measure, less restrictive of trade, is
reasonably available to meet its desired level of protection. Alternative
measures will be evaluated on the basis of factors suggested by the
Appellate Body in the Asbestos case; these will be balanced to determine
whether a less trade-restrictive alternative is reasonably available or, to use
treaty language, whether the regulation chosen is "necessary" to achieve
the public health objective.81 The regulation chosen is likely to be
considered "necessary" in situations where the common interests and
values pursued are shown to be vital and important and the regulation
makes a greater contribution to realizing the objectives, interests and
values sought than does an alternative measure. A less trade-restrictive
alternative will be considered "reasonably available" when it does not pose
serious administrative difficulties in implementation and it meets the goals
of the importing country and does so in a less trade-restrictive manner
than the regulation chosen. The list of factors the Appellate Body lays

Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.194; see Asbestos Appellate Body Report,
supra note 5, para. 163.
81Id.
'0
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down for consideration suggests that there is to be a loose, informal
process for comparing alternative measures by balancing the right that
WTO members have to avail themselves of the exception available under
Article XX (b) and their obligation not to abuse this right to cancel out the
right of their trading partners to access foreign markets within the
framework of the GATT 1994.
The necessity test, as formulated in the Asbestos case, accords
deference to national authorities in their choice of public health objectives
and the level of protection to achieve those objectives. The only constraint
imposed on regulatory autonomy arises from the need to justify objectives
and levels of protection by considering a number of factors to rule out the
possibility that there is a less trade-restrictive measure available to achieve
those objectives. On the basis of the text and its judicial interpretation in
the Asbestos case, Article XX(b) calls for a balancing test to be used as a
"trade-off" device between two sets of values - the economic gains from
increased trade, on the one hand, and increased protection from unhealthy
products, on the other hand.' This trade-off device consists of paying
deference to the regulatory autonomy of national authorities to pursue
public health objectives, while requiring in return a search for a less traderestrictive measure that will not compromise the public health objectives
rules.83 There is some danger that the looseness afforded by balancing
various factors could allow a panel to trade off an objective which, in their
view, is not vital or important in favor of a less trade-restrictive measure
which offers the benefits of increased trade. In such cases, a panel should
carefully consider deferring to national authorities on the issue of the
importance of a particular objective and not try to second-guess their
policy decisions. 84
3. Compensation for Nullification and Impairment
Once a country has justified a public health measure as necessary
under Article XX(b), it may yet have to face a cause of action on the basis
of non-violation nullification and impairment under Article XXIII.1(b).
The Asbestos case has clearly established that a non-violation cause of
action is available even when a measure has been justified under Article
XX(b). Although justification under Article XX(b) is available as a right

See Trachtman, supra note 72 (suggesting balancing is one of several "trade-off' devices).
WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and

Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), paras. 157, 159, 38 I.L.M. 118, 164-65
(1999) [hereinafter Report of the Appellate Body].
8 John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 511, at IV.A (2000).
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to WTO members85 and operates to establish that the right has not been
abused,"6 nonetheless, justification does not provide immunity from a nonviolation claim. The Appellate Body found a textual basis in the language
of Article XXIII.1(b) for its decision that justification under Article XX(b)
does not provide immunity from non-violation claims: the text, interpreted
according to its ordinary meaning, clearly provides that a non-violation
claim is available as a result of the application of "any measure." Thus, any
measure, including a public health measure, may be challenged on the
basis of non-violation nullification and impairment.
The possibility of a claim for compensation under Article XXIII.1(b)
does not prevent a country from regulating for public health purposes, as
the Panel pointed out, but it may make it more costly to do so and
consequently, may cast a regulatory chill on health policy decision-making.
To minimize this result, the Panel imposed conditions on the use of this
remedy so that it continues to be exceptional in nature, particularly in the
case of measures justified as necessary to protect public health.
In taking this approach, the Panel struck a balance between
competing rights so that one right does not cancel out another. On one
hand is the right of the importing country to use Article XX(b) as a way of
justifying the measure it has chosen to achieve its public health objectives.
On the other hand is the right of the exporting country to rely on the
benefits it had expected to receive after a round of negotiated reciprocal
concessions. Both rights are preserved: the right to invoke Article XX(b)
remains although somewhat impaired because the remedy in Article
XXIII.1(b) can be invoked. However, the impairment of the right to
invoke Article XX(b) is not serious because the remedy in Article
XXIII.1(b) will continue to be treated as exceptional in nature with
stringent conditions attached to its use.
V. CONCLUSION

The Asbestos case shows how the TBT Agreement and the GATT
1994 have implications for the autonomy of national authorities to make
regulatory distinctions between products for the purpose of protecting
public health. The TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994 both contain
rules which establish mechanisms to help national authorities and dispute
settlement panels decide which value is to take precedence: the economic
benefits of freer trade or the enhanced protection of human health.

"Report of the Appellate Body, supranote 83, paras. 157, 159.
"Id. para. 158.
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With respect to the TBT Agreement, the Asbestos case clarifies the
definition of "technical regulation" and, in so doing, provides useful
guidance as to when the TBT Agreement applies. The definition, as
expressed by the Appellate Body, suggests that a large number of product
regulations will be subject to the rules of the TBT Agreement, in particular
the rule that prohibits the use of regulations which create "unnecessary
obstacles to trade." Determining whether a technical regulation is an
unnecessary obstacle to trade is accomplished by requiring an assessment
of risks, based on scientific and other objective factors, that would be
created if the public health objective is not achieved. The risk assessment
provides the mechanism for trading off two values important to WTO
members: the economic benefits of increased trade and the desired level of
public health protection. The risk assessment provides a means for
determining, first, that a rational connection exists between a regulation
that restricts trade (the means) and the public health objective sought (the
end) and secondly, that the least trade-restrictive means available for
achieving the desired objective has been chosen by the regulating country.
Under the GATT 1994, the principal tool for constraining regulatory
autonomy is the national treatment rule. Once imports and products of
domestic origin are determined to be "like products," according less
favorable treatment to imports is inconsistent with the national treatment
rule. Consequently, the process for determining likeness can have a
significant impact on regulatory autonomy. The jurisprudence on likeness
in the Asbestos case is somewhat ambiguous in its implications for
regulatory autonomy. The Appellate Body may have increased the
latitude for countries to create legitimate regulatory distinctions between
products by ruling that the criteria for evaluating evidence of likeness are
not limited to the framework of four criteria applied by the Panel.
Furthermore, the criteria can accommodate new dimensions, such as risks
to health that can be used to differentiate products. However, the focus on
the competitive relationship between products in the marketplace as the
matrix in which evidence of likeness will be evaluated may serve to limit
the scope for regulatory distinctions unless the limitations of the market
are recognized and accommodated when the criteria are applied.
Should it be necessary for the regulating country to invoke Article
XX(b) to justify a measure that violates the national treatment rule,
jurisprudence on paragraph (b) in the Asbestos case introduces a process
designed to determine whether a trade rule (such as national treatment
under Article III) or the public health exception to the trade rule (Article
XX(b)) will win the day. The first step in the process requires the
regulating country to establish that the measure it has taken falls within
the range of policies covered in paragraph (b), that is, policies designed to
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protect human health. This threshold requirement resembles the rather
loose rational connection test between means and ends found in Article 2.2
of the TBT Agreement. Once a rational connection between means and
ends is established, the issue becomes one of finding a less trade-restrictive
alternative measure that achieves the level of protection sought and is
reasonably available to the regulating country. The device for making this
determination is the balancing of a number of factors to ensure that public
health objectives of a vital and important nature will not be sacrificed to
the economic benefits provided by increased trade in a harmful product.
Under both the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994, deference is
paid to the public health objectives sought and the levels of protection
desired by national authorities. At the same time, justification for
objectives and levels of protection must be offered in order to encourage
WTO members to consider the trade effects of implementing public health
measures. Deference and justification are both evident in the devices
established for determining when the right to regulate for public health
purposes will override the right to market access granted under WTO
rules.

